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INTRODUCTION
The principle that a wrongful conviction is worse than a wrongful acquittal dates
at least to the Book of Genesis, when God agreed not to destroy the city of Sodom if
as few as ten righteous people remained.1 The same idea can be found in classical
Greek and Roman writings as well.2 Later, developing European legal systems incorpo-
rated the classical abhorrence for wrongful convictions into their jurisprudence.3
Eventually, the idea made its way into Blackstone’s Commentaries in the famous
quote known as Blackstone’s Ratio: “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than
that one innocent suffer.”4 American jurists later imported Blackstone’s Ratio, along
with the rest of his Commentaries, embedding the idea into the Anglo-American
legal system permanently.5
The preference for acquittals is particularly relevant to the death penalty, because
death is a truly permanent sentence. In the United States, the number of death sentences
exponentially increased from the time of the first colonial settlements until the United
States Supreme Court’s Furman v. Georgia decision in 1972, which struck down all
death penalty statutes nationwide.6 Five years later, the Court reversed itself in Gregg
v. Georgia and reinstated the death penalty nationwide.7 Between the Gregg decision
and January 21, 2021, 1,532 people were executed in the United States,8 with the rate
of new death sentences steadily declining between 1996 and 2018.9 Of those 1,532,
the federal government executed sixteen.10 Despite the comparative infrequency of
the death penalty at the federal level, it remains an available, and clearly actionable,
1 Genesis 18:32 (King James); Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal
Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077 (2015).
2 See Epps, supra note 1, at 1077 (noting that both Aristotle and Justinian endorsed the
concept).
3 See id. at 1077–80.
4 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
5 See Epps, supra note 1, at 1080–81.
6 See 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972); see also History of the Death Penalty, DEATH
PENALTY INFO.CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/history-of-the-death-pen
alty [https://perma.cc/SFB9-QZCC] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
7 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
8 Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/execu
tions/execution-database [https://perma.cc/NA5M-VQPS] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
9 History of the Death Penalty, supra note 6. The rate further declined between 2018 and
2020: twenty-five executions in 2018; twenty-two executions in 2019; and seventeen executions
in 2020. Execution Database, supra note 8.
10 Execution Database, supra note 8.
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sentence.11 Demonstrating the federal death penalty’s continued potency, in July
2019, former Attorney General William Barr ordered the Federal Bureau of Prisons
to schedule executions for five federal death row inmates.12 The inmates were originally
scheduled for execution between December 9, 2019 and January 15, 2020.13 After
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia initially stayed federal executions
on a challenge from four of these inmates,14 on July 14, 2020, the Supreme Court
allowed the executions to proceed.15 All five originally scheduled inmates have since
been executed.16
While death sentences have declined since 1996,17 post-conviction exonerations
have risen during the same time.18 Between 1989 and January 23, 2021, 2,705 people
nationwide have been exonerated after conviction, serving a combined total of
24,609 years before their release.19 These exonerations have given scholars the tools
to begin empirically evaluating the accuracy of convictions in the American judicial
system.20 Scholars disagree on the exact conviction error rate in the United States,
but no scholar suggests that convictions in the United States are infallible.21 Indeed,
11 See John Brigham, Unusual Punishment: The Federal Death Penalty in the United
States, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 195, 196–97, 212 (2004).
12 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pub. Affs., Federal Government to Resume




14 Mark Berman & Ann E. Marimow, Trump Administration’s Plans to Resume Federal




15 Hailey Fuchs, Supreme Court, 5–4, Lifts Block on Federal Execution, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/us/politics/federal-execution.html [https://perma.cc
/ATG8-33Y7] (July 16, 2020).
16 Execution Database, supra note 8.
17 History of the Death Penalty, supra note 6.
18 Exonerations in the United States,NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law
.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx [https://
perma.cc/UMT7-B5TJ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
19 Id.
20 See generally D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified
Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J.CRIM.L.&CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007); Paul G. Cassell,
Tradeoffs Between Wrongful Convictions and Wrongful Acquittals: Understanding and Avoiding
the Risks, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1435 (2018).
21 Compare Risinger, supra note 20, at 762 (finding a 3.3% error rate in capital convic-
tions), with Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 197–98 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (endorsing
a 0.027% capital conviction error rate calculation (quoting Joshua Marquis, Opinion, The
Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01
/26/opinion/the-innocent-and-the-shammed.html [https://perma.cc/5YBA-X4GG])).
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even the Supreme Court acknowledged in Brady v. United States that defendants do
not always plead guilty because they are actually guilty.22
The idea that our justice system is fallible is not new and neither is the remedy
for wrongful convictions.23 The writ of habeas corpus dates to the Norman conquest
of England, and by the fourteenth century it evolved into a way for courts to review
wrongful convictions.24 By 1789, the writ of habeas corpus was already 700 years
old.25 Today, the writ is generally recognized as the primary tool for the wrongfully
convicted to free themselves.26
This Note will address the intersection of wrongful convictions, the federal death
penalty, and habeas corpus to conclude that the federal death penalty is an unconsti-
tutional violation of the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution.27 Part I
of this Note will establish that Congress may not suspend the writ of habeas corpus
outside of wartime. Then, Part II will show that wrongfully convicted prisoners there-
fore have a constitutional right to a habeas petition if they discover new, exonerating
evidence. Part III will argue that because executed prisoners cannot file a habeas
petition for release, executing wrongfully convicted prisoners is an unconstitutional
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Finally, Part IV will extend Part III to show
that the government has no way to know, prior to execution, who will be wrongfully
or rightfully executed and therefore the federal government may not execute any
prisoners without certainly suspending habeas corpus for some prisoners. Finally,
Part V will explore counterarguments to this Note’s argument.
I. SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The Suspension Clause reads: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.”28 However, suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus for U.S. citizens
have been rare in American history.29 President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus in
22 See 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
23 WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 12 (1980).
24 See id. at 14, 27–28.
25 Id. at 17.
26 Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Habeas Corpus for the Innocent, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 4 (2016).
27 The scope of this Note is limited. It does not address whether the Suspension Clause
should apply to the states as an element of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, whether habeas corpus is a privilege of all citizens under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, or whether federal executions in the military violate the Suspension
Clause. This Note will address only federal executions of private citizens and how they
violate the Suspension Clause.
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
29 See Tor Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, of the
United States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475, 1487 (2005).
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Maryland in 1861,30 President Grant suspended the writ in parts of South Carolina in
1871,31 the governor of the Philippines suspended the writ in two rebellious provinces
in 1905,32 and the governor of Hawaii suspended the writ following the attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1942.33 This Note will assume that no rebellion or invasion has justified
the suspension of habeas corpus or the execution of any specific federal prisoner.
Habeas corpus is an ancient, deeply rooted common law writ.34 Some scholars
date forms of habeas corpus to the Roman Empire,35 but William the Conqueror’s
invasion of England in 1066 marks the writ’s introduction to Anglo-American law.36
Originally, the writ of habeas corpus was executed by royal courts to begin an action,
rather than to release a prisoner.37 The writ acted as a jurisdictional tool, channeling
local legal proceedings into the king’s courts in order to nationalize and legitimize the
new Norman government.38 However, over the next 300 years the writ evolved into
its current form—a way for prisoners to challenge unlawful imprisonment.39 By 1787,
700 years after the writ’s inception, the writ of habeas corpus had firmly entrenched
itself as a basic civil right of English subjects and the newly independent American
citizens.40 The right was so fundamental that it was the only personal liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution prior to the Bill of Rights.41 Furthermore, the wording of the writ’s
guarantee in the Suspension Clause assumes that the writ was already universally
available but could now only be suspended under certain conditions.42
30 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
31 See Ulysses S. Grant, A Proclamation (Oct. 17, 1871), reprinted in 7 A COMPILATION
OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF PRESIDENTS: 1789–1897, 136–38 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1898) (“[T]herefore, I . . . do hereby declare that in my judgment the public safety especially
requires that the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended . . . and do hereby
suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus within [nine counties] in said State of
South Carolina.”).
32 Fisher ex rel. Barcelon v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 180 (1906). Due to armed insurrection
in Cavite and Batangas provinces, the governor suspended habeas corpus by proclamation,
then reinstated the writ approximately three months later. Id. at 180–81.
33 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307–08 (1946) (discussing the suspension of
habeas corpus in the Hawaiian territory and petitioners’ resulting prosecutions by military
tribunals).
34 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
748, 748–49 (1987); DUKER, supra note 23, at 17. See generally RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.
LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (7th ed. 2018).
35 See David J. Bederman, The Classical Constitution: Roman Republican Origins of the
Habeas Suspension Clause, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 405, 439–40 (2008).
36 See DUKER, supra note 23, at 14–15, 17.
37 See id. at 15.
38 See id. at 14–15.
39 See id. at 27–28.
40 See id. at 115.
41 See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I–VII.
42 See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (The assertion that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
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Today, the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy for unlawful imprisonment.43 As
a remedy for unlawful imprisonment, a petitioner must be imprisoned before asking
for the writ of habeas corpus.44 Typically, this means that the petitioner has already
been convicted of a crime and is challenging the lawfulness of his conviction.45 In
1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) radically changed
the procedural requirements for a habeas petition in federal courts.46 The AEDPA
narrowed the path to a successful petition, but it still left an achievable path for release
if a prisoner was wrongfully convicted.47 This Note focuses exclusively on habeas
petitions as remedies for wrongful convictions of federal prisoners following discovery
of new and exonerating evidence.48 Further, the relevant question for this Note is
whether federal prisoners can file a petition for habeas corpus, not whether their petition
will be granted.
A. Suspending Habeas Corpus
The Suspension Clause dictates that neither Congress nor the President may
suspend habeas corpus during peacetime.49 The clause’s meaning is largely self-
evident with regard to the federal government—the writ must be left alone unless the
country is invaded or has a rebellion.50 Historically, such justifications for the sus-
pension of habeas corpus are rare.51 Only the Civil War,52 domestic terrorism during
shall not be suspended” is not a positive grant of habeas corpus but a protection against its
infringement. (emphasis added)).
43 See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 521–22 (2006) (noting that federal habeas
claims can override states’ interests in criminal proceedings (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 319–22 (1995))).
44 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (“A prisoner in [federal] custody . . . may move . . . to
vacate . . . [his] sentence.”); Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 401 (2001)
(“The first showing a [habeas] petitioner must make is that he is ‘in custody’ . . . .”); see also
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–92 (1989).
45 See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 34, § 5.1.
46 See Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 443, 447–53 (2007) (discussing each of the five obstacles imposed on prisoners under
the AEDPA).
47 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 665 (1996) (quoting SUP. CT. R. 20.4(a)); Bousley
v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (first quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
496 (1986); and then quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–28).
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
49 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (“[The
Suspension Clause] ensures that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary
will have a time-tested device, the writ [of habeas corpus], to maintain the ‘delicate balance
of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.” (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion))).
50 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745.
51 See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
52 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 145–46 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
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Reconstruction,53 and unrest in the then-territory of the Philippines54 have justified
the suspension of habeas corpus for “rebellion.”55 The governor of the Hawaiian
territory in 1941 remains the only authority to invoke “invasion” following the attack
on Pearl Harbor.56 In the twenty-first century, the War on Terror introduced several
questions regarding the scope of who enjoys the privilege to file for habeas corpus.57
However, no court has questioned whether federal prisoners held within U.S. terri-
tory are entitled to petition federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus.58
One of the forms of habeas petitions is a petition for the writ following discovery
of new evidence of a constitutional defect in a prisoner’s conviction or sentence.59
This Note will focus exclusively on such federal prisoners—those held inside the
United States—and their categorical right to file a habeas petition in peacetime upon
discovering new evidence demonstrating their imprisonment is unlawful.
B. The Procedural Guarantee of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended by Congress or the President,
except in certain times of war.60 When and how the writ may be lawfully suspended
is not a question for this Note. However, absent a valid time of war the privilege of
habeas corpus may not be suspended at all.61
When Congress passed the AEDPA in 1996, prisoners peppered the new law with
suits alleging that various provisions of the AEDPA were unconstitutional suspen-
sions of habeas corpus.62 The suits generally alleged that the procedural hurdles
enacted by the AEDPA made filing for a writ of habeas corpus so difficult that the
AEDPA or one of its provisions represented a de facto suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.63 Although the AEDPA survived the onslaught of challenges, the Court
made clear in Felker v. Turpin that while Congress could regulate the procedure of
53 See Grant, supra note 31, at 136–38.
54 See Fisher ex rel. Barcelon v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 178–80 (1906).
55 See id. at 179–80.
56 See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307–08 (1946).
57 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004).
58 Cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 782–83 (1950) (declining to extend Fifth
Amendment protections to alien combatants).
59 See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–37 (2006) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 327 (1995)).
60 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
61 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996).
62 See, e.g., id. at 656–58; Denton v. Norris, 104 F.3d 166, 167 (8th Cir. 1997); In re
Davis, 121 F.3d 952, 953 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1142 (1997); Miller v. Marr,
141 F.3d 976, 977 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 891 (1998).
63 See, e.g., Felker, 518 U.S. at 656–58; Denton, 104 F.3d at 167; Davis, 121 F.3d at 953;
Miller, 141 F.3d at 977.
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habeas petitions, a true suspension would be unconstitutional.64 The Court reasoned
that even procedural hurdles as byzantine as those in the AEDPA could not actually
suspend habeas corpus so long as the law left a hypothetically viable path to a writ
of habeas corpus.65 Only a complete severance of access would truly suspend the
writ of habeas corpus.66
The Felker Court’s holding provides the lynchpin of this Note’s argument
because it guarantees procedural access to the writ of habeas corpus. If the prisoners
at issue in this Note are truly severed from all habeas access, then the government
violates the Suspension Clause.67 Therefore the difficulty, unlikelihood, or rarity of
habeas petitioners actually receiving a hearing on the merits of their claim is irrele-
vant to this Note’s argument. So long as every prisoner has a hypothetical chance
to file a habeas petition after finding new evidence, then these prisoners retain their
habeas corpus rights.
II. WRONGFULLY CONVICTED PRISONERS CAN BE RELEASED
THROUGH WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS WHEN NEW EXONERATING
EVIDENCE SHOWS ACTUAL INNOCENCE
Federal prisoners always have a path to a writ of habeas corpus because new
evidence can always open the actual innocence exception to procedural bars on habeas
petitions.68 The primary purpose of habeas corpus is to right wrongful imprison-
ments by the government.69 The writ of habeas corpus acknowledges the fallibility
of legal systems and offers an avenue to rectify wrongful convictions as miscar-
riages of justice.70
However, where convicted and sentenced prisoners petition for the writ of habeas
corpus, their strategic options are severely limited. Federal prisoners writing habeas
petitions have only one substantive theory of relief available.71 Generally, a federal
habeas petitioner must argue that their conviction was wrongful because it was issued
64 See 518 U.S. at 664.
65 Id. at 663–64.
66 Cf. id.
67 Cf. id. at 654, 660, 664.
68 Cf. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522 (2006) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
319–22 (1995)).
69 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“[T]he essence of habeas corpus
is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . . .”).
70 See id. at 484–85.
71 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (“A prisoner in [federal] custody . . . [may] claim[] the right
to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States . . . .”). Other avenues for release are for procedural errors such
as where “the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law” rather than for violations of substantive
rights. Id.
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illegally, in violation of the United States Constitution.72 However, the Court has hinted
at a phantom theory of habeas relief where a persuasive enough claim of actual inno-
cence could be grounds for a writ of habeas corpus itself.73
Even earning a hearing on the merits of one of these limited theories of relief is
difficult for federal habeas petitioners.74 A federal prisoner must first navigate
AEDPA’s infamous procedural maze to reach a judge considering the habeas petition
itself.75 However, a prisoner is never completely barred from filing a valid habeas
petition, because the prisoner always has the ability to use the actual innocence ex-
ception.76 As a result of the actual innocence exception, federal prisoners who maintain
their innocence always retain the potential to discover new evidence sufficient to show
actual innocence, and thereby they retain the potential to obtain a writ of habeas
corpus as guaranteed by the Suspension Clause.77
A. The Wrongfully Convicted Prisoner’s Path to Petition for Habeas Corpus
The path to a successful petition alleging a constitutional claim is narrow but
traversable. Generally, a petition for habeas corpus must include a constitutional
claim,78 including petitions involving new evidence.79 In a possible parallel path, the
Supreme Court has suggested but never directly held that habeas petitions, which do
not allege a constitutional violation are justiciable in federal courts.80
72 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337–38 (1963) (discussing petitioner
Gideon’s habeas corpus petition to the Florida Supreme Court arguing that he was entitled
to assistance of counsel during his criminal trial).
73 If the prisoner can make a truly compelling case of innocence, allowing the sentence
to continue would be an unconstitutional miscarriage of justice, even absent other consti-
tutional error. See infra notes 81–84, 96–97 and accompanying text.
74 See Marvin L. Astrada, Death, Law & Politics: The Effects of Embracing a Liberty-
Restrictive vs. a Liberty-Enhancing Interpretation of Habeas Corpus, 48 U. BALT. L. REV. 147,
158 (2019) (discussing the AEDPA’s effect of “codifying the Court’s restrictive interpretation
of habeas since the 1970s”).
75 See id. at 169–72 (detailing the procedural hurdles codified by the AEDPA).
76 See infra Section II.A.
77 See infra Section II.A.
78 United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (“[U]nless the claim alleges a
lack of jurisdiction or constitutional error, the scope of collateral attack has remained far more
limited.” (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 n.10 (1976))). But see id. (“[A]n error of
law” will not support a habeas action “unless the claimed error constituted ‘a fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” (quoting Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962))); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006) (citing Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417–19 (1993)) (assuming without deciding that upon a compelling
enough showing of actual innocence, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted absent other error).
79 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 789–90 (2008).
80 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; see also House, 547 U.S. at 555 (declining to resolve
Herrera’s open question for freestanding actual innocence claims, but holding that the peti-
tioner did not meet the necessary threshold regardless).
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Wrongfully convicted prisoners who make constitutional claims based on new
evidence have several possible paths to obtain a writ of habeas corpus. First, if a pris-
oner discovers new evidence within the AEDPA statute of limitations, the prisoner
may simply make a habeas petition under that Act.81 However, prisoners’ evidentiary
discoveries often fall outside of the AEDPA’s procedural limitations.82 If the AEDPA
procedurally bars a petition, then prisoners are still entitled to an adjudication on the
merits of their petition if the prisoner can demonstrate “actual innocence.”83
The actual innocence exception to procedural bars was created in the common
law and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court following the AEDPA’s passage because
refusing to hear the petition of an actually innocent prisoner would result in a “mis-
carriage of justice.”84 To demonstrate actual innocence, a prisoner “must show that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the prisoner]
in the light of the new evidence.”85 In these constitutional challenges, the actual inno-
cence exception negates procedural bars such as state rules of criminal procedure,86
federal rules of criminal procedure,87 and the AEDPA statute of limitations.88 Actual
innocence only guarantees a hearing on the constitutional merits, not the substantive
relief of a writ of habeas corpus itself.89
With respect to federal habeas claims specifically, the Court held in McQuiggin
v. Perkins that the actual innocence exception can overcome a procedural default
under the AEDPA’s statute of limitations.90 It also held that the exception can overcome
a procedural default for failure to raise a claim on direct review in Bousley v. United
States.91 However, the actual innocence exception still only applies to the procedural
validity of a habeas petition.92 A court will only grant actual habeas relief if the court
subsequently agrees that the prisoner’s conviction was constitutionally defective.93
However, the Supreme Court has hinted that actual innocence may be relevant to
substantive habeas relief as well.94 The Supreme Court has long assumed that executing
81 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), (f).
82 See, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386–87 (2013).
83 See id. at 387.
84 See id. at 392–94, 97 (holding that both state and federal statutes of limitation are
subject to the exception).
85 Id. at 399 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
86 See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).
87 See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622–24 (1998).
88 See McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399.
89 See id. at 399–401.
90 Id. at 399.
91 See 523 U.S. at 622.
92 See McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399.
93 See House v. Bell, No. 3:96-cv-883, WL 4568444, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007)
(granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus on remand following the Supreme Court’s order
to hear the petition’s merits despite procedural default).
94 See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 417 (1993)).
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an actually innocent person is unconstitutional.95 In Herrera v. Collins, the Court as-
sumed without deciding that if a prisoner made a “truly persuasive” showing of actual
innocence, then executing the prisoner would be unconstitutional and the prisoner
would be entitled to habeas relief or some state equivalent.96 However, the Court
further noted that the threshold for such a showing would be “extraordinarily
high.”97 The Court has yet to formulate a true standard for such a freestanding actual
innocence claim.98
The Court’s language on nonconstitutional habeas petitions is not definitive.99
However, the Court’s dicta outlining a nascent doctrine surrounding such claims sug-
gests that the Court would entertain such petitions under the federal habeas statute
if the question was squarely presented to it. Therefore, executing federal prisoners
even without a constitutional claim may be an unconstitutional suspension of habeas
corpus, because those federal prisoners may have an unelucidated right to petition
for release upon making a “truly persuasive” claim of actual innocence.100 Given that
those federal prisoners have as much hypothetical capability to discover new evidence
as prisoners with constitutional claims, executing them would suspend habeas corpus
for the federal prisoners without constitutional claims as well.101
Ultimately, however, which specific path a prisoner takes to a petition is not im-
portant. Rather, the key concern is whether the prisoner has at least one. New evidence
can entitle a wrongfully convicted prisoner to a writ of habeas corpus, whether con-
stitutionally based or otherwise.102 So long as the Court holds that there is a viable path
for challenging a wrongful conviction using new evidence, then any wrongful federal
execution will suspend the privilege of habeas corpus for the wrongfully executed
prisoner because such new evidence could surface after execution.103
B. DNA Exoneration and Its Challenges
Beginning with the first DNA exoneration in 1989,104 DNA evidence has ex-
onerated 375 prisoners through January 23, 2021.105 But for the new DNA analysis
95 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; House, 547 U.S. at 554–55.
96 506 U.S. at 417 (“We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in
a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would
render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief [for
federal prisoners].”).
97 Id.
98 Cf. id.; House, 547 U.S. at 554–55.
99 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; House, 547 U.S. at 554–55.
100 Cf. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; House, 547 U.S. at 554–55.
101 See infra Part III.
102 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
103 See infra Part III.
104 Rob Warden, First DNA Exoneration, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC: CTR. ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonera
tions/il/gary-dotson.html [https://perma.cc/8EF9-RKEY] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
105 DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.inno
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provided by nonprofit groups and some government programs, these exonerated
prisoners would have languished in prison while actually innocent.106 The longest-
serving exoneree represented by the Innocence Project served nearly four decades in
a Louisiana state prison.107 For wrongfully convicted prisoners across the country, relief
could take decades of waiting and searching for suitable evidence to show actual
innocence.108 For prisoners sentenced to death, those decades may not be available.
1. DNA Exoneration and Nonprofit Organizations
Wrongfully convicted prisoners today may benefit from the proliferation of non-
profit organizations dedicated to exonerating prisoners using DNA evidence wherever
possible. These organizations include The Innocence Project and the broader Innocence
Network, the Northwestern Center on Wrongful Convictions, and the Deskovic Foun-
dation.109 Despite exoneration organizations’ best efforts, their work can be slow, and
their clients often remain in prison for decades before the government releases them.110
Much of the delay is caused by a lack of surviving DNA samples from the crime
scenes or other destruction of evidence.111 The organizations are further limited by
cenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/GU9D-VRU2] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2021); see also Changes in DNA Exoneration Over Time, NAT’L REGISTRY
OFEXONERATIONS 2–3 (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Docu
ments/Changes_In_DNA_Exonerations.pdf [https://perma.cc/53E2-VTWY] (noting an addi-
tional seventy-nine exonerations as of 2016 where DNA evidence was a contributing, but not
primary, factor in release).
106 E.g., Malcolm Alexander, INNOCENCEPROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases
/malcolm-alexander/ [https://perma.cc/NVM2-NZ8L] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (served thirty-
eight years); Christopher Abernathy, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject
.org/cases/christopher-abernathy/ [https://perma.cc/BHY6-PQ6F] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021)
(served twenty-eight years); George Allen, INNOCENCEPROJECT, https://www.innocenceproj
ect.org/cases/1119/ [https://perma.cc/FVB9-YAYX] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (served thirty
years); Randolph Arledge, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases
/Randolph-arledge/ [https://perma.cc/2TGH-57F3] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (served twenty-
nine years).
107 Malcolm Alexander, supra note 106.
108 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 106.
109 About, INNOCENCEPROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/TUQ2
-SX7U] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); About Us, INNOCENCE NETWORK, https://innocencenet
work.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/ALP6-KH9G] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); About Us, NW.
CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, https://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/wrongful
convictions/aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/565F-NDRK] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); About Us,
DESKOVIC FOUND., https://www.deskovicfoundation.org/about [https://perma.cc/73AP-XPSB]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
110 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 106.
111 Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological
Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM.CRIM.L.REV. 1239, 1240–41 (2005);
Catherine Greene Burnett, “If Only”: Best Practices for Evidence Retention in the Wake of
the DNA Revolution, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 335, 349–57 (2011).
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frequent resistance from local law enforcement112 and the stringent procedural maze
created by the AEDPA.113 The organizations also lack sufficient resources to address
every purported wrongful conviction in the country.114 Wrongfully convicted prisoners
must not only wait for nonprofit organizations to litigate their cases, the prisoners
must also manage to get the attention of the organizations in the first place.115
Despite the challenges, these nonprofits have managed to exonerate thousands
of wrongfully convicted prisoners.116 Further, the nonprofits may be able to serve an
increasing number of prisoners as new legislation begins to require criminal prose-
cutions to better preserve DNA evidence for later testing.117 Wrongfully convicted
prisoners today, including those on death row, may reasonably expect that a nonprofit
group will at least investigate their cases to see if the prisoners can be exonerated.
However, any wrongfully convicted prisoner may have to wait years, even decades,
to begin filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.118 In the interim, those whom the
government wrongly sentences to death might be executed without ever engaging
with an exoneration nonprofit.119
2. Lack of Government-Provided DNA Investigation
Wrongfully convicted prisoners must rely so heavily on nonprofit organizations
to exonerate them in large part because numerous hurdles make it nearly impossible to
access comparable assistance from the federal government. The Supreme Court
ruled in 2009 that convicted prisoners do not have a constitutional right to post-convic-
tion DNA testing under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.120
112 See Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of
Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1112 (2013); see also Aviva
Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction
Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 435–37 (2011).
113 See Kovarsky, supra note 46, at 447–53.
114 For example, the California Innocence Project (CIP) “cannot free the innocent without
[financial] help from the public” since it handles over 1,500 cases every year. CAL. INNO-
CENCEPROJECT, https://californiainnocenceproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/6BAD-LXZ7] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2021).
115 See, e.g., How to Submit a Case, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://californiainno
cenceproject.org/submit-a-case/submit-a-case/ [https://perma.cc/36JZ-YPLL] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2021).
116 Exonerations in the United States, supra note 18 (reporting 2,705 exonerations of wrong-
fully convicted prisoners between 1989 and Jan. 23, 2021); see also Innocence by the Numbers,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/innocence /innocence
-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/HMX2-RR2J] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (reporting 174
exonerations of wrongfully death-sentenced prisoners between 1973 and Jan. 23, 2021).
117 See generally Krista A. Dolan, Creating the Best Practices in DNA Preservation:
Recommended Practices and Procedures, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 319 (2013).
118 See id. at 319–20.
119 See id.
120 Dist. Att’y’s Off. for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 56 (2009).
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Instead, the issue has been left to Congress, which passed a law in 2004 offering
DNA testing to prisoners but under extremely limited conditions.121 To obtain post-
conviction DNA testing, federal prisoners must meet ten procedural conditions.
In capital cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3600 mandates that properly petitioned DNA testing
be completed within sixty days of the government’s response to a testing petition,
and follow-up testing be completed within 120 days of the initial testing’s comple-
tion.122 However, the second condition for testing mandates that the government
only test evidence which was previously collected in relation to the investigation of
the crime for which the court convicted the prisoner.123 Therefore, federal prisoners are
precluded from obtaining testing to support any alternate theories not initially investi-
gated by the government, including DNA samples from new, alternate suspects.124
Federal prisoners’ limited access to DNA testing through the government cements
the reality that wrongfully convicted prisoners, including death-sentenced prisoners,
could have to wait decades to prove their innocence through DNA testing. They
cannot rely on government support to help them build their case, nor can they rely on
swift or reliable access to nonprofit organizations.125 For those wrongfully sentenced
to death, the wait for resources could stretch past their execution date.
C. Wrongful Convictions and Police Misconduct
DNA testing is not the only way that prisoners are exonerated—some prisoners are
exonerated following revelations of police and prosecutor misconduct surrounding
their convictions.126 These exonerations can also take years or decades, and prisoners
have even less control over investigations into government misconduct than into DNA
testing.127 Government misconduct which requires an exoneration includes failure
121 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600; see also H.R. 5107: The Justice for All Act of 2004, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION, https://aclu.org/other/hr-5107-justice-all-act-2004 [https://perma.cc/E79Q
-FHZ2] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
122 See § 3600(d).
123 § 3600(a)(2) (“[T]he court that entered the judgment of conviction shall order DNA
testing of specific evidence if . . . [t]he specific evidence to be tested was secured in relation
to the investigation or prosecution of the [claimed wrongful conviction] . . . .”).
124 See id. (If an alternate suspect was not investigated initially, then a new DNA sample
from such an alternate suspect will not have been “secured in relation to the investigation of
the [claimed wrongful conviction].”); United States v. Adams, No. 4:94cr4045-WS, 2010
WL 1186563, at *2 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting a prisoner’s petition to test the DNA in a rape
kit for the prisoner’s semen because the rape kit was not collected by the government during
its investigation or prosecution of the prisoner).
125 See supra Section II.B.1.
126 See Christopher R. Smith, I Fought the Law and the Law Lost: The Case for Congres-
sional Oversight over Systemic Department of Justice Discovery Abuse in Criminal Cases,
9 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 85, 86–96 (2010).
127 See id. at 95.
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to disclose exculpatory evidence,128 manufacturing of evidence,129 or perjury by
officers at trial.130
Wrongful convictions which stem from such misconduct cannot be proven until
the misconduct is exposed, which can take years.131 Further, police misconduct will
always be a part of our legal system because human institutions are always vulnera-
ble to human imperfections. No amount of reform or oversight can completely
guarantee that no person will be wrongfully convicted due to police misconduct in
the future. Like in cases where the evidence against a prisoner is refuted by new
DNA testing, wrongfully convicted prisoners convicted due to police misconduct
may also file for a writ of habeas corpus.132 However, prisoners whom the govern-
ment wrongfully sentences to death may be executed before the police misconduct
which led to their convictions is exposed.133
D. The Future of Evidence in Wrongful Convictions
Over time, new forensic techniques will likely continue to emerge which will
reveal more wrongful convictions in the future.134 A state trial court in Illinois admitted
the first fingerprint evidence in 1911.135 DNA exonerated its first defendant in
1989.136 Today, voice137 and facial138 recognition software grow more sophisticated
128 See id. at 87–91; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
129 See Smith, supra note 126, at 89 (describing federal prosecutors knowingly presenting
false police testimony to the court).
130 See id.
131 See Kenneth Williams, The Pros and Cons of Texas’s Michael Morton Act, 60 S. TEX.
L.REV. 267, 273 (2019) (discussing two cases of men who were released from prison following
discovery of prosecutorial misconduct in their convictions: Michael Morton, who served
twenty-five years in prison before release, and Anthony Graves, who spent twelve years on
death row before release); Jerry P. Coleman & Jordan Lockey, Brady “Epidemic” Misdiagnosis:
Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Sanctions to Deter It, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 199,
208–15 (2016) (detailing, inter alia, three instances of federal prosecutorial misconduct).
132 See Coleman & Lockey, supra note 131, at 220.
133 Cf. Williams, supra note 131, at 273.
134 See Forensic Science: Problems and Solutions, INNOCENCEPROJECT, https://innocence
project.org/forensic-science-problems-and-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/J7DX-NQWQ] (last
visited Mar. 15, 2021).
135 People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (Ill. 1911) (holding that fingerprints left by
Jennings at the scene of the crime in wet paint were admissible evidence).
136 Warden, supra note 104.
137 See Arielle M. Rediger, Always-Listening Technologies: Who Is Listening and What
Can Be Done About It?, 29 LOY.CONSUMER L.REV. 229, 231–41 (2017); David Talbot, Wiping
Away Your Siri “Fingerprint,” MITTECH.REV. (June 28, 2012), https://www.technologyreview
.com/s/428053/wiping-away-your-siri-fingerprint/ [https://perma.cc/PR9G-2UVE] (explaining
that human voices carry unique biometric “fingerprints” which can be used to identify speakers).
138 See Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591, 1593–95
(2017) (discussing the proliferation of facial recognition technology in law enforcement);
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by the year. Computer models continue to hone forensic ballistic analysis.139 Scien-
tists run “body farms” designed to study human decomposition in various conditions
and times.140 All of these fields have the potential to create new and powerful analyses
of old information in old cases.
Prisoners might be exonerated by a ballistics algorithm analyzing crime scene
photographs or by ruling out a hidden background voice in a 911 call.141 Computer
analysis of closed-circuit television footage might find a different culprit than the
prisoner on death row.142 An overlooked detail from an autopsy report might prove
a victim was killed hundreds of miles from the prisoner convicted of killing the victim.
Science has advanced exponentially over the past century,143 and new techniques could
easily be adapted to forensic investigation. New and sophisticated investigative
techniques will certainly help law enforcement, but they will also mean that prison-
ers claiming actual innocence will have new methods of proving their innocence.
Over the next twenty years, it is a virtual certainty that prisoners will find new tech-
niques and technologies to prove their innocence. It is impossible to know what those
techniques will be, but history insists that they will arise. After using the new tech-
niques to prove their innocence, some prisoners will be able to file for a writ of habeas
corpus and go free.144 However, wrongfully convicted prisoners executed today will
never be able to use the new techniques and never be able to file for a writ of habeas
corpus. Instead, such executions will suspend habeas corpus for those executed
prisoners who are proven innocent through new techniques, because the dead cannot
file petitions.145
III. WRONGFUL EXECUTION IS A SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The dead cannot file for a writ of habeas corpus. Most obviously, the dead cannot
file a habeas petition, because they can no longer write a petition nor ask their attorney
Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L., TECH.,
& POL’Y 281, 287–89 (discussing emerging facial recognition techniques and applications).
139 Automated Firearms Ballistics Technology, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS
&EXPLOSIVES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.atf.gov/firearms/automated-firearms-ballistics
-technology [https://perma.cc/R2ZU-ZAU5] (explaining the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms & Explosives’s (ATF’s) computerized ballistic forensic analysis capabilities); see
Nancy Ritter, Study Identifies Ways to Improve ATF Ballistic Evidence Program, NAT’L
INST. JUST. J., Dec. 2014, at 12, 12–18 (identifying significant “untapped potential” in the
ATF’s computerized ballistic analysis capabilities).
140 See Soren Blau, Body Farms, 13 FORENSIC SCI., MED. & PATHOLOGY 484–85 (2017).
141 See Talbot, supra note 137. See generally Ritter, supra note 139.
142 See Hirose, supra note 138, at 1594.
143 Compare People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (Ill. 1911), with Hirose, supra note
138, at 1593–95 (comparing the novelty of fingerprint evidence to developments in facial
recognition technology).
144 See supra Section II.A.
145 See infra Part III.
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for the same. Legally, the dead also have no standing to file—the government no longer
holds the dead in custody, and no court order could reanimate them to grant release.146
In wrongful convictions, though, a prisoner must be able to file a habeas petition
upon showing actual innocence under the Suspension Clause.147 When the wrong-
fully convicted are executed and later proven innocent, under the Suspension Clause
they must be able to file a habeas petition, but they cannot because they were executed
by the government. In such cases where the federal government directly prevents the
exercise of a constitutional right, the government has violated that right.148 Here, ex-
ecuting wrongfully convicted prisoners is a violation of the prisoners’ right to a habeas
petition under the Suspension Clause.149
A. Suspension of Habeas Corpus by Execution
All convictions risk being wrongful, including in the federal criminal justice sys-
tem.150 Death-sentenced prisoners suffer such wrongful convictions along with ordinary
prisoners.151 Therefore, some federal prisoners sentenced to death in the federal system
146 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)
(“[O]ur cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing . . .
[requires that] it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the [alleged] injury
will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426
U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976))).
147 See supra Part II.
148 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“[T]he freedom to marry, or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State.”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples
have a constitutional right to marry without government interference); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 416 (1989) (“[T]he government may not prohibit expression simply because it
disagrees with its message . . . .”); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24 (2018) (holding that religious persons may not be persecuted by
a hostile government); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that
a total ban on handguns violates the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (holding that Florida violated an indigent
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to appoint an attorney for him).
149 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
150 See Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261,
262–72 (2012). See generally SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT: INSIDE WRONGFUL CON-
VICTION CASES (2004); MICHAELL.RADELET,HUGOADAMBEDAU &CONSTANCE E.PUTNAM,
IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992).
151 Since 1971, 174 death row inmates have been exonerated in the United States, although
none were held by the federal government. Innocence Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/innocence-database [https://perma.cc/J4QL
-9B6T] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). The lack of a federal death row exoneree does not prove
that the federal government has not or will not wrongfully convict and execute a prisoner
because the number of federal death row inmates is so low. Death Row, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview [https://perma.cc/UG8W-B9LN]
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were and will be wrongfully convicted.152 Then, once a wrongfully convicted prisoner
is sentenced to death, the prisoner faces the looming prospect of wrongful execution.
Wrongfully executed prisoners cannot file a habeas petition.153 The dead lack the
voice to ask an attorney to write a petition, the dexterity to author a petition on their
own, and the Article III standing to be heard in federal court.154 Despite having an
equal right to file a habeas petition if the prisoner finds new evidence of innocence
or illegal custody,155 wrongfully executed prisoners are denied their right to at least
file a petition. But for their death, these wrongfully executed prisoners would have
been able to file a habeas petition upon discovering new evidence.156 By executing
a wrongfully convicted prisoner, the federal government cuts off a prisoner’s ability
to ever file a habeas petition after finding exonerating evidence.157 When the federal
government entirely removes a prisoner’s ability to file for habeas corpus, then the
federal government has suspended the privilege of the writ under the Suspension
Clause.158 Under the Suspension Clause, the government may not suspend the wrong-
fully convicted prisoner’s privilege of habeas corpus, except “when in Cases of Rebel-
lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”159 Therefore, executing a wrongfully
convicted prisoner is unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause, absent a lawful
suspension of the privilege of the writ due to an invasion or rebellion.160
B. Article III Standing for Habeas Corpus and Wrongful Convictions
Critics might argue that the lack of Article III standing for the wrongfully executed
actually makes the Suspension Clause a nonissue for wrongful executions rather than
a violation of the Suspension Clause.161 Through its standing requirement,162 Article
III might sever the chain of causation between a wrongful execution and the inabil-
ity of the wrongfully executed prisoner to petition for habeas corpus, rather than link
(last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (reporting that as of October 1, 2020, only about two percent of
death row inmates in the United States are held by the federal government).
152 See Innocence Database, supra note 151; Death Row, supra note 151.
153 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (quoting
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)) (requiring a complainant to
show, inter alia, redressability of an injury through favorable judgment for standing purposes).
154 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
155 See supra Part II.
156 See supra Section II.A.
157 Habeas corpus relief is impossible for dead persons. See supra notes 146–49 and
accompanying text.
158 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996).
159 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
160 See Felker, 518 U.S. at 663–64.
161 See LN Management, LLC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 957 F.3d 943, 953 (9th
Cir. 2020) (“[T]he dead lack the capacities that litigants must have to allow for a true Article
III case or controversy.”).
162 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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the two.163 Therefore, critics might argue, the dead prisoners’ habeas rights are not
suspended but barred by Article III.164
However, the fact that wrongfully executed prisoners cannot file for habeas
relief due in part to lack of standing does not mean that the government did not
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Wrongfully executed prisoners’
inadequate Article III standing does not affect the issue of whether the government
suspended those prisoners’ habeas corpus right, because the prisoners would only
lack standing after their executions.165 The government, through its direct action in
ending the wrongfully convicted prisoner’s life, cuts off all future access to the writ
of habeas corpus.166
By causing a situation where the executed prisoners have no Article III standing,
the government causes the prisoners to be cut off from their right to a habeas petition.167
The execution, coupled with Article III standing, would merely be the mechanism by
which the government suspends habeas corpus. Regardless of the mechanism used,
the government may not suspend habeas corpus at all in peacetime.168 The government
may not hack rights away from a person then blame its ax for the missing rights.
IV. UNCERTAINTY OF INNOCENCE REQUIRES ENDING ALL FEDERAL EXECUTIONS
Wrongfully convicted prisoners are not wrongfully convicted intentionally. At the
time of their conviction, such prisoners appeared to a judge or jury to be guilty.169 This
Note does not address questions of the adequacy of due process when sentencing pris-
oners to death. This Note assumes all sentences are carried out in good faith, free of
racial or gender bias. Therefore, because wrongfully convicted prisoners appear identi-
cal to rightfully convicted prisoners in all procedural aspects prior to discovering new
evidence,170 the government has no way of knowing whether any given execution
will kill a guilty or a factually innocent person. Because the government has no way of
knowing whether an executed prisoner is wrongfully convicted, the government further
163 See id.
164 Cf. Elizabeth Jean Barger, Eleventh Circuit: Survey of Recent Decisions, 24 CUMB. L.
REV. 615, 622 (1994) (“The plaintiff’s lack of standing precluded the court from redressing
their claims of economic, environmental, and procedural damages.”).
165 At the time of execution, any exonerating evidence would not be present, otherwise
the prisoner would have already filed for a writ of habeas corpus. Instead, new exonerating
evidence surfacing after a prisoner’s execution is what would enable the prisoner to file a
habeas petition.
166 Cf. Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (holding that Congress had the authority to change the
habeas procedural landscape through the AEDPA).
167 See supra Part II.
168 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008).
169 See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions
After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 832–34 (2010) (discussing
how the factually innocent were afforded all of their rights except that they were not actually
guilty of the charged crime).
170 See id.
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does not know whether the prisoner will be able to later produce new, exonerating evi-
dence for a habeas petition several years or decades after the date of execution.171 From
the federal government’s point of view, any prisoner whom the federal government
would execute has the potential to have been wrongfully convicted and able to prove
their innocence later on if spared from execution.172 Therefore, so long as a wrongful
conviction is possible in the federal justice system, any federal execution constitutes
a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the executed prisoner.
A. Innocent and Guilty Death-Sentenced Prisoners Look Identical Prior to
Discovery of New Evidence
By their nature, wrongful convictions are camouflaged. On paper, a wrongful
conviction will look identical to a rightful one.173 Wrongfully convicted prisoners
will have been arrested, arraigned, tried, and convicted.174 They will have had the same
access to evidence, the same voir dire, and the same rules of evidence as a guilty
prisoner.175 In fact, some wrongful convictions may not even be avoidable mistakes of
the judicial system. Perhaps a forensic technique did not exist when the wrongfully
convicted prisoner was tried, or maybe exonerating evidence was lost.176 If wrongful
convictions were easy to identify, they would be far less prevalent. However, wrongful
convictions do happen, and habeas corpus ensures that prisoners have an avenue to
redress them.177 Regardless of why a prisoner was wrongfully convicted, the pris-
oner will always appear as guilty as his rightfully convicted cellmates until new
exonerating evidence appears.178
B. Wait and See: The Only Constitutional Option
Given that the wrongfully convicted prisoner blends in perfectly with the crowd
of guilty prisoners, the government cannot know at any given time who will later find
new evidence sufficient to make a habeas petition.179 Ordinarily, the government does
not have to concern itself with who was wrongfully convicted. So long as prisoners
are housed, fed, and given necessary medical attention, the government can apply
a wait-and-see policy to developing cases.180 That calculus changes with regard to
171 See supra Section II.A.
172 This is true regardless of any general statistics. Ninety-nine out of one hundred pris-
oners might be guilty, but that statistic cannot predict which prisoner is innocent, making every
prisoner potentially innocent.
173 See Gould & Leo, supra note 169, at 832–34.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See supra Sections II.B, II.D.
177 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
178 See Gould & Leo, supra note 169, at 832–34.
179 See id.
180 See Project, Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
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executions. For prisoners on death row, the government must consider who was
wrongly convicted and who is guilty, because the prisoners’ execution dates render
the wait-and-see method insufficient. Executions are final, and after a prisoner’s
death there is no telling whether he or she would have discovered new evidence to
support a habeas petition.181
If the government cannot tell who was wrongfully convicted by simply looking
at a prisoner’s file, nor can they tell who will prove themselves innocent in the future,
the only method of maintaining a wrongfully convicted prisoner’s right to a habeas
petition based on new evidence is to wait for that prisoner to develop evidence of
a constitutional violation or perhaps a strong showing of actual innocence.182 The
wait-and-see approach is the only way to avoid suspending a wrongfully convicted
prisoner’s habeas corpus right. Executing a wrongfully convicted prisoner at any time
will suspend that prisoner’s habeas right.183 Therefore, if the government cannot con-
stitutionally execute the wrongfully convicted, and cannot distinguish between the
wrongfully convicted and the guilty, then the government has only one remaining
option: wait and see. Any execution at all by the federal government of a federal pris-
oner who might be innocent is logically indistinguishable from executing a wrong-
fully convicted prisoner.184 Executing a wrongfully convicted prisoner is a violation
of the Suspension Clause.185 Therefore, any federal execution is a violation of the
Suspension Clause.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. Executions Are Distinct from Other Indeterminate Violations of Civil Rights
Such as in Washington v. Davis
A critic might disagree with this Note by analogizing to Washington v. Davis.186
Given this Note’s reliance on the premise that the government violates the Constitu-
tion when it acts to certainly violate someone’s constitutional rights or liberties but
does not know whose rights are violated or exactly when,187 Davis provides a coun-
terpoint by noting that even racial discrimination is not constitutionally cognizable
until a concrete example appears.188 Therefore, the indeterminacy of the Suspension
Court and Courts of Appeals 1988–1989, 78 GEO. L.J. 1429, 1441 (1990). See generally
Hedieh Nasheri, A Spirit of Meanness: Courts, Prisons and Prisoners, 27 CUMB. L. REV.
1173 (1997).
181 See supra Sections II.B, II. C (discussing the timing of new and potentially exonerating
evidence).
182 See supra Section II.A.
183 See supra Part III.
184 See supra Section IV.A.
185 See supra Part III.
186 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
187 See supra Part IV.
188 Davis, 426 U.S. at 245–48 (holding that a police academy examination was not racially
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Clause violation argued by this Note would be insufficient to show an unconstitu-
tional act by the government.189
But Davis is not relevant to this Note. The indeterminacy question at the heart of
that case was whether any constitutionally cognizable racial discrimination existed
at all.190 By contrast, the indeterminacy in wrongful executions asks not whether
wrongfully convicted prisoners exist,191 but rather which prisoner might have peti-
tioned for habeas corpus in the future.192
The constitutional free speech doctrine provides a more helpful analogy than the
Equal Protection Clause here. The Court has consistently and explicitly overprotected
speech,193 especially in the political arena.194 While the Court acknowledges that
some protected speech is likely worthless or counterproductive,195 the Court also errs
on the side of caution to protect more speech.196 To avoid labeling a speaker’s mes-
sage worthless when it actually does carry worth, thereby violating the Constitution,
the Court instead protects even some worthless speech from censorship.197
The same logic applies to wrongful convictions and executions. The justice
system is fallible, so the courts allow for writs of habeas corpus to solve wrongful
convictions retroactively.198 However, executions are permanent. So, rather than
ignore human error when determining guilt or innocence, the federal government
must refrain from executing anyone at all,199 even though some of the prisoners
sentenced to death are actually guilty of their sentenced crimes.200 Any other policy
discriminatory merely because fewer black applicants passed the test than white applicants,
absent more specific evidence of racial bias).
189 Cf. id.
190 See id.; see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266–71 (1977) (reaffirming the Court’s holding in Davis that the mere possibility of racial
animus does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, rather a plaintiff must show discrimina-
tion through additional evidence).
191 See supra Part II.
192 See supra Part IV.
193 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (protecting even speech of
“negligible” value in the public sphere).
194 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171–73 (2015) (holding that the Town of
Gilbert’s sign ordinance banning certain kinds of signs was content-based and did not survive
strict scrutiny); see also id. at 183–85 (Kagan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the ordinance’s
harmlessness and encouraging a looser scrutiny); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (protecting Johnson’s right to burn the American flag while denounc-
ing the act as “repellant”).
195 See, e.g., Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460–61.
196 Compare id., and Reed, 576 U.S. at 171–73 (majority opinion), with id. at 183–85
(Kagan, J., concurring).
197 See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
198 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
199 See supra Part IV.
200 See David Von Drehle, More Innocent People on Death Row than Estimated, TIME
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would knowingly allow occasional violations of the Suspension Clause, just as a
stricter free speech doctrine would knowingly allow occasional violations of the
Free Speech Clause.201
B. Barring All Federal Executions Is Not Overbroad
Critics might also argue that barring all federal executions will create a slippery
slope where any wrongful conviction that leads to a death will be a suspension of
habeas corpus. Then, by this Note’s logic, all life sentences would also suspend habeas
corpus. The slippery slope might also include any sentence which is not technically
for life but during which the prisoner is sure to die.202
This slippery slope argument fails to acknowledge the unique nature of execu-
tions relative to other punishments. Governmental action distinguishes executing
wrongfully convicted prisoners as a suspension of habeas corpus from wrongfully
convicted prisoners simply dying in prison,203 which is not a suspension of habeas
corpus. While wrongfully convicted prisoners serving a custodial term (even a life
sentence) might die while serving their sentences,204 their deaths would not be a gov-
ernment act. A suspension of habeas corpus must be some act or omission by the
government.205 Merely processing petitions slowly or erecting procedural hurdles
is not a suspension of the writ so long as there is some procedural path for wrongfully
convicted prisoners to be granted the writ of habeas corpus if the prisoners discover
new evidence.206 Executions of wrongfully convicted prisoners are not omissions or
conditions; they are governmental actions that constitute a suspension of the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus. Natural deaths of wrongfully convicted prisoners
are tragic, but so long as the government respects the prisoners’ habeas right while
the prisoners are alive by not actively severing the right, then the government has
not suspended the right of habeas corpus.207
(Apr. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://time.com/79572/more-innocent-people-on-death-row-than
-estimated-study/ [https://perma.cc/6RVW-BWBG]. Von Drehele reports that approximately
4.1% of death row convictions are erroneous—so 95.9% of such convictions must have been
legally rightful. See id.
201 See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text.
202 Imagine a 500-year total sentence or an eighty-five-year-old given a thirty-year sentence.
203 See supra Sections III.B, V.A.
204 See, e.g., Timothy Cole, INNOCENCEPROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases
/timothy-cole/ [https://perma.cc/Q97Q-ZKV9] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (Although he died
in prison, Timothy Cole received a posthumous pardon after serving twenty-three years for
a rape which DNA evidence later proved he did not commit.).
205 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996).
206 See id.
207 See supra Section I.B.
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C. The Writ of Coram Nobis Does Not Cure the Constitutional Defect in Federal
Executions
The writ of coram nobis does not cure the constitutional defect in federal ex-
ecutions. Coram nobis provides prisoners with a tool to overturn convictions where
the prisoner was clearly actually innocent of the crime.208 However, the writ of coram
nobis is distinct from habeas corpus because a court grants a writ of coram nobis
after release.209 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court extended the writ of coram
nobis to the federal judicial system only after the newly minted federal habeas corpus
statute210 restricted the writ of habeas corpus to current prisoners.211 Therefore, a
prisoner sentenced to death in the federal system would not even have access to a writ
of coram nobis because the death-sentenced prisoner would never be released. The
Suspension Clause guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus, specifically, will not
be suspended except in certain times of war.212 The Suspension Clause does not men-
tion the writ of coram nobis.213 One writ cannot paper over the suspension of another
writ when they are not interchangeable remedies.
D. Federal Executions Are Unconstitutional Despite the Low Success Rate of
Habeas Corpus Petitions
Habeas petitions are rarely successful,214 so some might say that barring all
federal executions to entertain hypothetical petitions which will almost certainly fail
is so inefficient that the rule’s burdens on judicial efficiency and finality outweigh
the burden on prisoners’ constitutional rights.215 However, such an argument would
ignore the text of the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause is categorical and
208 Right to Writ of Coram Nobis as Affected by Intentional or Negligent Failure to Bring
Facts to Attention of Court, 58 A.L.R. 1286 (1929) (“The purpose of the writ of coram nobis
is to bring before the court rendering the judgment matters of fact which, if known at the time
the judgment was rendered, would presumably have prevented its rendition.”); see also United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512–13 (1954) (holding that the writ of coram nobis is avail-
able after a sentence is completed, when a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available).
209 See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512–13.
210 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
211 See § 2255(a); Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510–11.
212 See supra Section I.A.
213 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
214 See Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Federal Habeas
Corpus and the Piecemeal Problem in Actual Innocence Cases, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 56, 58 (2014) (noting that when prisoners petition for habeas corpus, less than
0.4% of petitioners receive any relief from the federal courts).
215 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631–32 (2002) (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 77 (1985)) (weighing three due process factors to decide whether to extend Brady’s
right to exculpatory evidence disclosure to impeachment evidence in the plea bargain phase
of prosecution).
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absolute within its limits;216 judicial and law enforcement efficiency cannot justify
entirely abrogating a constitutional guarantee.217
Further, the Supreme Court only guarantees access to habeas corpus, not the
relief of the writ itself in every case.218 In other words, there is no constitutional
guarantee to have a petition for a writ of habeas corpus granted, it is the filing of the
petition which is protected by the Suspension Clause.219 Therefore, the frequency of
successful habeas petitions does not bear on whether the right to petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is infringed.220
CONCLUSION
The Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees that federal
prisoners are always entitled to the right to file a petition for habeas corpus with the
courts, except in certain times of war.221 Anglo-American law holds a long tradition
of disgust for wrongful convictions.222 Among other uses, the writ of habeas corpus
is a tool to right such wrongful convictions.223
Today, the ancient writ serves as the primary correction vehicle for those wrong-
fully convicted prisoners who find new evidence through new technology or new
information that helps prove their convictions were handed down in violation of the
Constitution or that they are undeniably innocent of the convicted crime.224 When new
evidence comes to light that provides wrongfully convicted federal prisoners the
grounds to challenge their convictions, they challenge their convictions by exercising
their right to the writ of habeas corpus.225 For those who were wrongfully executed,
the writ of habeas corpus cannot help.
The dead cannot file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, no matter how demon-
strably innocent they may have been. Those who died in prison of nongovernmental
deaths and are later revealed to have been wrongfully convicted do present a tragedy
of injustice. However, for those who were executed by the federal government, the
revelation of their innocence renders their executions unconstitutional.226 If not for
216 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
217 Cf. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629–32 (using policy to determine whether due process requires
a governmental disclosure by determining what due process is, as opposed to whether it can
be violated).
218 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
219 See id.
220 See John L. Carroll, Habeas Corpus Reform: Can Habeas Corpus Survive the Floor,
6 CUMB. L. REV. 363, 374–75 (1975).
221 Supra Part I.
222 See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
223 Hartung, supra note 26, at 4.
224 See supra Part II.
225 Supra Part II.
226 Supra Part III.
908 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:883
the government, wrongfully executed prisoners might have filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus and gone free or reduced their sentences. Instead, the government’s
execution stripped any wrongfully executed prisoners of their constitutional right
to a petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
The only remedy for the constitutional violation of wrongfully executed prison-
ers’ right to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not to execute those prisoners
who were wrongfully convicted.227 The question then becomes how the government
can tell which death-sentenced prisoners were wrongfully convicted and which were
not.228 That question has no answer, and the government will never be able to tell
who was rightfully or wrongfully convicted with any true certainty.
As such, the government must either knowingly execute prisoners who hold a right
to a future petition for habeas corpus when they discover evidence of their innocence,
or not execute anyone at all to avoid wrongful executions entirely. Because any ex-
ecution carries the certainty that the prisoner could be innocent and could be entitled
to a future petition for a writ of habeas corpus, any execution by the federal govern-
ment violates the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution. The federal
government’s only remaining legal option is to completely abstain from executions;
any other policy would be unconstitutional.229
227 See supra Part IV.
228 See supra Section IV.A.
229 See supra Section IV.B.
